Syria’s post-war economy is in pieces. A decade of war has left factories in ruins, farmland parched, and businesses struggling to regain their footing. Amid this devastation, Turkey has stepped in—not as a saviour, but as a power pursuing its own interests. It has extended its influence over northern Syria, controlling trade, redirecting agricultural output, and shaping local industries in ways that benefit Ankara more than Damascus.

In the power vacuum left by war, Turkey has embedded itself into Syria’s economy, selling its own goods in markets once dominated by local producers and securing access to natural resources. While this has brought some short-term relief—such as jobs, trade, and a semblance of stability—the long-term picture resembles economic capture more than recovery.

Trade Relations and Economic Dependency

A large aspect of Turkey’s economic role in Syria is its dominance over trade routes in northern Syria. Turkish goods have flooded local markets, outcompeting domestic Syrian products that are still reeling from years of conflict. Its control over northern border crossings has allowed Ankara to dictate the flow of goods in these regions. While this has provided some economic activity in war-torn areas, it has also led to increased reliance on Turkish imports.

This trade imbalance raises concerns about Syria’s economic sovereignty. Amir Huquq from Enab Baladi further explores how Turkish businesses, backed by government policies, have increasingly penetrated Syria’s consumer markets. As a result, local Syrian producers face significant challenges in reviving their industries, unable to compete with cheaper and more readily abundant Turkish products. Rather than fostering Syrian economic self-sufficiency, Turkey’s trade policies have created a cycle of dependency—benefiting Turkish businesses while restricting Syria’s economic autonomy.

“We Need to Eat”

Supporters argue that Ankara’s economic engagement has brought much-needed stability to parts of Syria. Turkish investments in infrastructure, local administration, and trade routes have indeed stimulated some economic activity in these areas. For many Syrians, Turkish goods, jobs, and investments are more than economic strategies—they are a lifeline. After years of war, survival takes precedence over sovereignty. Imported food is better than empty shelves, and a stable income—regardless of its source—is better than none. In the short term, Turkey’s economic presence has provided some relief, offering employment and access to essential goods that local industries are too weakened to supply. But this relief comes at a cost. As dependency deepens, Syria’s ability to rebuild on its own terms continues to shrink. What seems like a necessary bridge to recovery today may become a barrier to long-term economic independence tomorrow.

Meanwhile, Turkey’s economic policies in northern Syria sideline Damascus, exacerbating fractures in an already fragile economic landscape. Turkish-backed authorities set trade regulations, determine market access, and enforce policies that entrench economic reliance on Ankara rather than fostering national recovery. What’s emerging is not a cohesive rebuilding effort but a patchwork of influence zones.

The Agricultural Sector: Who Benefits?

Agriculture has long been a cornerstone of Syria’s economy, but the war has severely disrupted this sector. Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s agricultural industry has further complicated recovery efforts, with accusations of exploiting agricultural resources in northern Syria, including diverting water supplies and integrating Syrian corps into Turkish supply chains.

Amir Huquq outlines how Turkish-backed authorities in northern Syria have influenced local agricultural production, sometimes redirecting crops toward Turkish markets rather than allowing them to support local Syrian food security. This raises pressing questions: Is Turkey seeking regional stability or primarily serving its own economic interests?

Wheat, olives, and other crops are flowing north, fueling Turkish markets rather than feeding Syrian ones. Turkish-backed authorities set the prices and dictate terms, leaving Syrian farmers needing to comply. Instead of fostering independent agricultural recovery, Turkey’s policies seem to be reinforcing economic structures that tie northern Syria’s economy to Turkish interests.

Factories Stripped and Stalled

Rebuilding Syria’s industry should be a priority. Instead, reports suggest that Turkey has stripped machinery from Syrian factories and transported it across the border. Industrial plants in Aleppo and other regions have reportedly been dismantled, with equipment resurfacing in Turkish businesses. This practice, if substantiated, suggests that Turkey may have actively contributed to the degradation of Syria’s manufacturing base, rather than aiding its recovery.

Sarah Dadouch points out how Turkish companies have capitalised on Syria’s weakened economy, securing investments in reconstruction projects often directed toward Turkish firms rather than Syrian ones. Syrian businesses—once self-sufficient—now find themselves competing for contracts in their own country against companies backed by the very power that dismantled their infrastructure.

New Beginnings or New Dependencies?

While Turkish trade, agricultural policies, and industrial involvement have facilitated economic activity in war-ravaged areas, they have also triggered concerns about dependency, economic exploitation, and regional control. Rather than supporting a Syrian-led recovery, Turkey’s actions suggest a strategy that prioritises its own interests—often at the expense of Syria’s long-term economic sovereignty.

The questions now are not just whether Turkey is helping Syria’s economy, but on whose terms this recovery is taking place. While Turkish involvement has brought some stability and trade, it has also deepened Syria’s economic dependence in ways that may be difficult to reverse. True recovery should empower local industries, rebuild Syria’s self-sufficiency, and restore control to Syrians themselves. Whether that happens, or whether economic reliance on Turkey becomes the new status quo, remains to be seen.